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Potential Immunity of Land Use
Control Systems from Civil Rights
and Antitrust Liability
By FRED BossELmAN* AND JOEL BONDER**
Introduction
In the last few years the United States Supreme Court has
issued a number of decisions dramatically affecting the operations
of local government. In City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.,1 the Court ruled that local governments are responsible
for compliance with federal antitrust laws. In Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services,2 the Court ruled that local governments
are subject to suit under section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights
Act.s
These two cases are likely to stimulate much litigation against
local governments. The many ramifications of this new liability af-
fect a wide range of governmental services and facilities. Decades
will be required to fully explore and resolve all of the unanswered
questions left open by these cases.
This article deals with one municipal function that is a source
of potential liability under both antitrust and civil rights laws: the
function of land use control. This article deals with only one aspect
of the potential liability: the extent to which local governments
may claim protection under the umbrella of immunity granted to
the states under both civil rights and antitrust laws.
Land use control is a function of local government in each of
* Partner-Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons (Chicago, Illinois). B.A., Uni-
versity of Colorado, 1956; L.L.B., Harvard University, 1959.
** Associate-Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons (Chicago, Illinois). B.A.,
University of Rochester, 1971; J.D., Washington University, 1974.
1. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
2. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1980).
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the fifty states. In the nineteenth century local governments en-
forced a wide variety of police power regulations to control specific
types of land use and regulate various categories of buildings and
structures. 4 Early in the twentieth century this pattern of regula-
tion evolved into standardized systems of planning and zoning that
attempted to regulate comprehensively such factors as the type
and density of land use.5 Regulation of new subdivisions also be-
came common. 6
Until the mid-1960's the regulation of land use by most local
governments followed a common pattern. A zoning ordinance and
a subdivision ordinance were the typical regulatory tools and these
ordinances showed only minimal evolution beyond those used
earlier in the century.7
In the last decade and a half, however, land use control has
witnessed a blossoming of new techniques in which planning has
assumed a much more important role.8 Experimental systems of
growth management and environmental regulation appear
regularly.9
This increased experimentation with new land use control sys-
tems has been accompanied by a trend towards revised state legis-
lation. Whereas the legislation of the 1920's merely provided en-
abling authority for local governments to engage in planning,
zoning and subdivision control, and established certain procedural
safeguards, the new legislation tends to be more complex.10 Many
states now make local land use planning and regulation mandatory
for some or all units of local government.11 Other states require
4. See, e.g., Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 125, 13 P. 310 (1887); Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me.
403 (1835); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846); Brick Presbyterian
Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826).
5. See E. BAssETT, ZONING 27.29 (2d ed. 1940); S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN, 201-03
(1969).
6. E. YoKLEY, THE LAW OF SUBDnvSIoNS 1-2 (1963).
7. See AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, A MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 28 (1976); S.
TOLL, supra note 5, at 296.
8. See Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regula-
tion, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 899 (1976).
9. See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH, vols. I-III, (R.
Scott ed. 1975); N. WILLIAMS, 5 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 423-31 (1974).
10. See generally N. WILLIAMs, supra note 9, at 388-415; DeGrove, The Political Dy-
namics of the Land and Growth Management Movement, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 111
(1979).
11. See Mandelker, supra note 8, at 956-65.
[Vol. 8:453
LAND USE SYMPOSIUM
that local plans and regulations comply with standards that are
substantive as well as procedural.12 A number of the states exper-
iencing rapid population growth have established new land use
control responsibilities for state or regional agencies.' 3 In addition,
the state courts in a number of influential states have imposed sig-
nificant substantive responsibilities upon local governments.14
To the extent that local land use control powers become in-
creasingly constrained by more detailed 'requirements of state law,
the burdens imposed by state mandates may be offset by a signifi-
cant benefit. The more clearly a local government can show that its
land use controls are part of a system that provides statewide stan-
dards and statewide supervision, the better it can argue that it
should be entitled to share the state's immunity from liability
under both the antitrust and civil rights laws.
This article will not attempt to survey the wide range of vari-
eties of new state land use legislation; it will examine the laws of
three states: California, Nevada and Oregon, which span the spec-
trum of state involvement. Oregon has undertaken a complete re-
form of its land use control regulations, establishing detailed sub-
stantive standards with which local governments must comply and
giving significant enforcement powers to state-level agencies. Ne-
vada relies heavily on the 1920's model of land use control powers:
planning has become mandatory for larger local governments, but
local regulation is subject to few state-level standards. California
has a complex system of land use control with less state involve-
ment than in Oregon, though more than in Nevada. Planning is
mandatory for most jurisdictions and the state has established de-
tailed content requirements. In the coastal zone the state's role is
enhanced by substantive policies and oversight responsibilities of a
state agency.
In examining the extent to which local governments in each of
these three states may argue that they share the immunity of the
state government itself, this article will attempt to analyze the ra-
tionale behind such immunity and to provoke further thought on
patterns of state legislation that will tend to distribute this immu-
nity in an equitable fashion.
12. See, e.g., HAwAn REV. STAT. §§ 225-1 to -26 (1980).
13. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.25 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981).
14. See N. WILLiAMs, supra note 9, at 107-11.
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I. Potential Civil Rights Liability: Background
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act was one of the laws
passed during the Reconstruction period by a northern-dominated
Congress concerned that public officials in the South would not re-
spect the rights of the newly-freed slaves.15 Section 1983 has since
evolved into a broad-ranging remedy under which the plaintiff
need only show (1) he has been deprived of some right under the
Federal Constitution or statutes; and (2) the action causing the
deprivation was taken under color of state law."
Prior to the Monell decision local governments were held ex-
empt from the reach of section 1983 because they were not "per-
sons" within the meaning of the statute as evidenced by legislative
intent.1 7 Nevertheless, local governments found themselves en-
meshed in section 1983 litigation through suits brought against
individual officers of local governments. 8 As a practical matter, the
local governments had to defend the actions of their officials, but
the fact that local governments could not be sued directly often
made it difficult for plaintiffs to recover.' Moreover, the absence
of local government from the litigation lent an aura of artificiality
to the proceedings and made-many cases depend on the extent to
which the individual defendants could prove a qualified immunity
by showing they had acted in good faith. °
The Monell decision reversed the long standing interpretation
of the statute and held that Congress had intended to allow suits
against local governments directly.21 The number of final appellate
15. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665-69 (1978).
16. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
17. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
191 (1961).
18. One circuit judge has said that "[a] judge is tempted to conclude that the chief
weapon expected to forestall Orwell's 1984 is the United States Code's § 1983." Coffin, Jus-
tice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 567, 570 (1971). See also Maine v.
Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2515 n.16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Aldisert, Judicial Ex-
pansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and
the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & SOC'L ORDER 557, 563.
19. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 n.33 (1980).
20. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 705-07 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
21. Id. at 690. Moreover, in Owen v. City of Independence, the Supreme Court ruled
that local governments were absolutely liable for all unconstitutional actions representing
municipal policy or custom and could not defend on the basis of good faith immunity. 445
U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
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decisions applying section 1983 to local land use regulations is still
relatively limited because of the short time that has elapsed since
the Monell decision. However, prior to Monell a number of circuits
had ruled that local governments could be sued directly under the
Fourteenth Amendment for constitutional deprivations.22 While
relatively few cases were brought on this theory, they do offer an
example of the type of litigation that may be anticipated under
section 1983 as applied to land use controls.
Probably the most ominous decision for local governments is
the Sixth Circuit opinion in Gordon v. City of Warren.2s The case
began when the City sought to enforce its "master thoroughfare
plan" against Mr. Gordon, who was in the process of constructing
an apartment building. The City found that he had built within
the area of setback established by the city plan for the purpose of
facilitating the future widening of streets. Mr. Gordon defended by
arguing that the City's thoroughfare plan was an unconstitutional
attempt to widen the streets without paying appropriate compen-
sation. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Gordon.
The court recognized that similar setback lines could have been
imposed for reasons other than facilitation of future street widen-
ing. The court also recognized that the courts of some jurisdictions
upheld the municipal power to establish setback lines for future
street widening but concluded that the better view was that such
plans were unconstitutional. The court held that the setback line
was invalid and that Mr. Gordon's building was lawfully
constructed.2
Mr. Gordon then brought a new action in the federal court
seeking damages for the injuries caused him by the unconstitu-
tional action of the City of Warren.2 5 The Sixth Circuit ruled that
22. See generally Comment, Municipal Liability for Constitutional Violations: Can
You Fight City Hall? A Survey of the Circuits, 16 DUQ. L. REv. 373 (1978).
23. 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978).
24. Gordon v. Warren Planning & Urban Renewal Comm'n, 388 Mich. 82, 199 N.W.2d
465 (1972).
25. Plaintiffs under section 1983 need not claim any discrimination on the basis of
race or color; any unconstitutional deprivation of property is sufficient to form the basis of a
claim. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). Judge Friendly has noted the
irony of this interpretation. "[T]he framers of the [Civil Rights Act], whose concern, as the
references show, was with the rights of the freedmen in the South, would have been no end
surprised to find that it encompassed an attack on a Connecticut garnishment statute and
still more so to find it was applicable to a creditor's claim for impairment of the obligation
of a contract." H. FRmNDLY, FEDERAL JURMsDIcTION: A Gs.NEsi. Vmw 91 (1973). Compare,
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the plaintiff had stated a cause of action and remanded the case to
the trial court for a hearing on the amount of damages to be
awarded."6
The Gordon case poses a serious threat to local land use con-
trols. Many of the constitutional standards that local governments
must meet are imperfectly defined. The taking clause, which was
relied upon in the Gordon case, is a good example. The courts have
emphasized that no clear line may be drawn between permissible
regulation and invalid taking, but each case must be evaluated on
its merits by weighing a series of countervailing factors, many of
which are intangible.27
In addition, cases like Gordon may impose liability for actions
that could not have been determined to be unconstitutional at the
time they were taken.2 Moreover, plaintiffs may claim rights
under other federal laws whose reach could not easily be forecast. 9
This imposes a heavy burden on municipal attorneys advising
clients about the potential validity of actions they seek to take.
Given the perils of exercising land use controls under these
circumstances, local governments may welcome opportunities to
trade some degree of state supervision for a share of the state's
immunity. The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not in-
tend to apply section 1983 against the states themselves, and thus
any activities such as land use control that were undertaken by the
however, the view of Judge Oakes of the same circuit that the Lynch case properly remedied
an overreaction to the reasoning employed in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 911, 917 (1979). See also McClendon v. Rosetti, 460 F.2d 111, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1972).
26. 579 F.2d at 392. Cf. Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081, 1096
(6th Cir. 1978).
27. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
28. An argument based on retroactivity was raised in Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 628 n.18 (1980), in which the action was alleged to be unconstitutional on the
basis of a Supreme Court decision that came down after the action was taken. However, the
Court rejected any requirement of intent and held that local governments were absolutely
liable for any action found to be unconsitutional. 445 U.S. at 638. See, e.g., Huemmer v.
Mayor of Ocean City, 632 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1980), in which the court found unconstitu-
tional a city ordinance giving a property owner the authority to call an authorized towing
agency to remove any vehicle illegally parked on his property. Citing Owen, the court re-
jected the municipal defendants' good faith defense that they had relied "on an apparently
regular ordinance whose constitutionality had never been questioned." Id. at 372. See also
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1133, 1204-05 (1977).
29. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
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state would be immune from suit for damages under section 1983.30
A state acts through many subdivisions and entities. However, it is
not always easy to determine when an action may be considered
one by the state itself rather than one by an independent entity.3 1
II. Potential Antitrust Liability: Background
The application of the federal antitrust laws to local govern-
ments follows a history that is remarkably similar, though coinci-
dentally so, to the history of the application of the federal civil
rights laws. In both areas the seminal decision was a 1978 ruling of
the United States Supreme Court holding local governments liable.
In the antitrust field the case was City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co."2
The major federal antitrust laws were enacted in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries in an attempt to counter
perceived abuses of monopoly power and to encourage free compe-
tition among business enterprises.33 Although the statutes them-
selves are relatively brief and simple, a large and complex body of
judicial decisions interpreting them has developed over the years.'
In 1943 the Supreme Court held definitively that actions of
state government would not be subject to federal antitrust laws.
Because the states are sovereign, said the Court, it would not
lightly interpret congressional intent as designed "to restrain state
action or official action directed by a state."' 5
After Parker v. Brown,36 some federal courts tended to inter-
30. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The Court concluded that Congress did not
intend "to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." Id. at 341. In the
absence of a specific congressional intent to authorize damage suits against a state the Elev-
enth Amendment operates as a bar to bringing such suits in the federal courts. Marrapese v.
Rhode Island, 49 U.S.L.W. 2275 (U.S.D.C. R.L Oct. 10, 1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment:
An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293, 324-27 (1980).
31. See discussion in Section HI(A) infra.
32. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. See generally P. AREDA & D. TURNER, ANTIRrUST LAW, vols. I-V (1978).
35. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). An earlier case had suggested the possi-
bility that states were immune from the Sherman Act. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332
(1904). See also Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs, and Raisins: An Analysis of the State
Action Doctrine under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 31, 35-38 (1979).
36. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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pret the states' immunity broadly, exempting a wide variety of ac-
tions on the ground that they were subject to state regulation. 7
Beginning in 1975, however, the Supreme Court began to interpret
the state action doctrine more narrowly. In Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,8 the Court held that anticompetitive activities (i.e., a
minimum fee schedule established by the bar) were immune only if
they were compelled by the state acting in its sovereign capacity.39
In the Lafayette case the Court applied similar prificiples in
determining the extent to which local governments could claim the
state action exemption. Although the Court lacked a majority, the
opinion suggested at least a risk of liability for any local action
that was not absolutely mandated by state law.40
The Court expanded further on the new state action doctrine
in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Alumi-
num, Inc.41 It said that its recent decisions established two basic
standards for immunity under the state action doctrine. The an-
ticompetitive action must be clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy, and the policy must be actively super-
vised by the state itself.42 The Midcal case involved a state law
which required each liquor wholesale? to establish a uniform
wholesale and retail price for each of its brands of liquor and pro-
hibited the sale of liquor below the established price. The Court
held that the system met the first half of the test but failed the
second. There was a clearly articulated state policy in favor of
price fixing, said the Court, but the state made no attempt to su-
pervise the implementation of that policy itself because it had del-
egated the power solely to the individual manufacturers and dis-
tributors of liquor.43
Subsequent to the Lafayette decision a number of lower
courts have explored the potential application of the antitrust laws
to local land use control decisions." Under the antitrust laws, as
37. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971).
38. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
39. 421 U.S. at 790.
40. 435 U.S. at 413-17. See also id. at 434-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
41. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
42. Id. at 105.
43. Id. at 105-06.
44. See Whitworth v. Perkins, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911
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under section 1983 of the Civil Rights laws, potential municipal
liability has been greatly expanded. This expansion has not been
accompanied by clear limitations or standards. The ultimate ex-
tent of this liability will be defined only gradually and at great cost
to local governments, given the complex and time-consuming
nature of this type of litigation.
This cost can be substantially reduced if local governments
can devise means of exercising their responsibilities in a manner
that will fall under the umbrella of the states' immunity from both
the civil rights and antitrust laws. The next section of this article
will examine in more detail the factors that the courts have con-
sidered in determining whether an activity is entitled to the states'
immunity.
III. Delegation of the States' Immunity
A. Criteria for Finding Immunity from Section 1983
Actions
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court held in Monell v.
Department of Social Services that Congress had intended to per-
mit suits against local governments under section 1983 of the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Act. This conclusion was tempered, however, by
the Court's reminder that its holding was "of course, limited to
local government units which are not considered part of the State
for Eleventh Amendment purposes. ' 45 It is this important qualifi-
cation in Monell, and the Court's subsequent holding in Quern v.
Jordan,46 that states are not "persons" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1983, which serve as the starting point for our discussion of
(1979); Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); Cedar
Riverside Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd, 606 F.2d
254 (8th Cir. 1979). Most of these opinions have been rendered at the motion to dismiss
stage and have tended to support the plaintiff's right to maintain the action, though some-
times expressing skepticism about his ability to prove the alleged facts. The result of these
decisions has been to expose local governments to potential litigation over a wide variety of
land use regulations that might be thought to have anticompetitive effects. Thus, for exam-
ple, Whitworth involved a small town's use of zoning to allegedly maintain a monopoly for
the mayor on the sale of liquor by denying requested zoning to a competitor. The Mason
City case involved an alleged agreement between the City and a downtown redeveloper
under which the City agreed not to permit the competitive shopping centers. The Cedar
Riverside case involved the allegedly anticompetitive use of urban renewal powers.
45. 436 U.S. at 690 n.54.
46. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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the criteria which determine whether local governments qualify for
immunity under state land use planning statutes.
To date, courts have considered the question of whether or not
a state has delegated its immunity largely in terms of whether the
governmental body exercising power can be viewed as either the
"alter ego" or "arm" of the state,47 or whether the political entity
is more similar to a municipality or county.48 The consistent posi-
tion of the courts has been to deny Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities
even if they possess a "slice of state power.' 49
Recently, the courts have looked to a number of factors in
deciding whether a governmental activity is entitled to a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The analysis always begins with a
review of the applicable state law.50
In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,51 the Supreme Court considered whether a school district
was "to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, or [was] to be treated as a munic-
ipal corporation or other political subdivision." The answer, com-
mented the Court, "depend[ed], at least in part, upon the nature
of the entity created by state law." 52 The Court considered the fol-
lowing characteristics of school boards under Ohio law: (1) Ohio
school boards are subject to guidance from the State Board of Ed-
ucation, (2) school boards receive a significant amount of money
from the state, (3) the term "state" does not include "political sub-
divisions" and school districts were included in the term "political
subdivisions," and (4) local school boards have extensive powers to
issue bonds and levy taxes within certain restrictions of state law.
On balance the Court concluded that an Ohio school board was not
an arm of the state entitled to share its immunity.
47. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-18 (1973).
48. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977).
49. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
401 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior
College, 519 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1975), affd per curiam on rehearing, 522 F.2d 204 (5th
Cir. 1975).
50. Kramer, Section 1983 and Municipal Liability. Selected Issues Two Years After
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 12 URB. LAW. 232, 259 (1980).
51. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
52. Id. at 280.
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In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,53 the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' ruling that California and Nevada had delegated Eleventh
Amendment immunity to the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA), which was "exercising a specially aggregated slice of state
power."" The Supreme Court pointed out that both California and
Nevada had filed briefs disclaiming any intent to confer immunity
on the TRPA. The Court focused on the provisions of the Inter-
state Compact creating the TRPA, under the terms of which the
Agency was described as a "separate legal entity" and a "political
subdivision." Six of the ten governing members of the Agency were
appointed by counties and cities; funding under the Compact was
to be provided by the counties; and state treasuries were not liable
for obligations of the Agency.
Commenting that the regulation of land uses is traditionally a
function of local governments, the Court concluded that:
[W]hile TRPA, like cities, towns, and counties, was originally
created by the States, its authority to make rules within its ju-
risdiction is not subject to veto at the state level. Indeed, that
TRPA is not in fact an arm of the State subject to its control is
perhaps most forcefully demonstrated by the fact that California
has resorted to litigation in an unsuccessful attempt to impose its
will on TRPA.55
The Court held, however, that the individual members of the
TRPA had absolute immunity for their legislative actions.56
53. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
54. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1977).
55. 440 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 402-06. The Court did not have occasion to consider whether the TRPA
itself, in addition to its individual members, might also be immune for legislative acts. In a
subsequent case, however, the Court held that in some cases agencies "who exercise dele-
gated legislative power" may "enjoy legislative immunity," and denied that the Lake Coun-
try Estates opinion contained any contrary implication. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers
Union, 446 U.S. 719, 733 n.11 (1980). In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980),
the Court ruled that a local government was not entitled to claim the so-called "qualified"
or "good faith" immunity that protects individual public officials who actually and reason-
ably believe that their actions are lawful. The question whether a local government could
claim absolute immunity for legislative actions was not before the Court, although the opin-
ion contains dicta that seems unsympathetic to such immunity. Id. at 649-50. If the state
may delegate immunity to the TRPA or its supreme court by delegating legislative power to
it, then it is hard to see why the delegation of legislative power to a local government to
exercise land use control functions should not carry with it absolute immunity for those
actions that are legislative in nature, such as rezonings. See Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogos-
lavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1980). If legislative immunity were available to local
Spring 1981]
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The principles established by the Supreme Court for testing
delegation of immunity have been applied by lower federal courts
to a variety of governmental agencies, most frequently universities,
school districts, state review boards and social service agencies. A
series of cases arising in Texas has explored the relative position of
a number of different public institutions of higher education.
In both Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College5 7 and Hander v.
San Jacinto Junior College,58 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that Texas junior colleges were not entitled to the
state's immunity. The court looked to the nature of the entity
under state statutes controlling the establishment, funding and op-
eration of junior colleges. The court found that while the statutory
scheme governing public junior colleges authorized a system-wide
"coordinating board" to "exercise general control" over such insti-
tutions, it explicitly provided that all residual administrative au-
thority would be retained in the individual junior colleges. More-
over, under the Texas scheme, the establishment of a junior college
district began with local initiative. The local district's electorate
selected a board of trustees to operate the college, and the trustees,
in turn, were empowered to issue revenue bonds and to levy annual
ad valorem taxes. State funds issued to junior college districts were
intended merely to supplement local funding. Finally, Texas case
law had long and consistently recognized that school districts were
independent political corporations. The court concluded:
In Eleventh Amendment cases, the question of whether or
not the state is "the real party in interest" is one of federal law,
but federal courts must examine the powers, characteristics and
relationships created by state law in order to determine whether
the suit is in reality against the state itself.59
governments it would strengthen the already strong incentive to use legislative techniques
for making land use decisions. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976). However, Owen's rejection of the qualified immunity for local government makes
the possible existence of a delegated absolute immunity for local government very specula-
tive. Compare Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 653 n.37, with Supreme Court of
Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 733 n.11.
57. 588 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 595 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1979).
58. 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975). See also the Texas cases analyzed in Kramer, supra
note 50, at 259-61.
59. Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d at 279. In Gay Student Servs. v.
Texas A&M Univ., 612 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1980), the court reaffirmed its reasoning in
Goss, but found it unnecessary to decide whether Texas A&M University was an arm of the
state. Id. at 165 n.5.
[Vol. 8:453
More recently, in Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin University,0 the
court used the analysis in Goss and Mt. Healthy in concluding that
the defendant University was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
damages immunity. The court noted that the University's bonding
authority was even more extensive than that of the Texas junior
colleges, and that revenue bonds issued by the University were not
general obligations of the state. The University's board of regents
also had more extensive administrative powers, such as the power
to make employment decisions irrespective of the state public em-
ployment scheme.6 1
However, district court decisions in Texas have concluded that
state universities with a statewide base are entitled to immunity.
In Henry v. Texas Tech University,62 an employment discrimina-
tion suit was brought against Texas Tech University and Texas
Tech Medical School. Finding that the defendants were "alter
egos" of the state, and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment im-
munity, the district court acknowledged the guidance provided by
Hander and analyzed the powers and relationships created by
state law. The court was influenced by the fact that Texas law pro-
vided for the governance, control and direction of policies of the
University by a state board of regents appointed by the governor
and possessing eminent domain power. State funds were used to
acquire and operate the University and a Coordinating Board had
been given management power over a broad range of policy deci-
sions such as curricula, financial appropriations, construction plans
and degree programs. Furthermore, the court noted, in addition to
the statutory factors considered, it was important to consider
whether a judgment would have to be paid from state funds.6 s
A similar conclusion was reached in Bailey v. Ohio State Uni-
versity," in which an Ohio court, using Mt. Healthy as a guide,
concluded that Ohio State University was the alter ego of the
state.6 5
60. 486 F. Supp. 663, 667-72 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
61. Id. at 671.
62. 466 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Tex. 1979). See also Hart v. University of Tex., 474 F.
Supp. 465 (S.D. Tex. 1979), holding the defendant hospital to be "an instrumentality of the
State of Texas for Eleventh Amendment and 1983 purposes." Id. at 467.
63. 466 F. Supp. at 145-46.
64. 487 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
65. Id. at 604-06. See also Skehan v. Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 590 F.2d
470 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979) (holding that state colleges in Penn-
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Since Mt. Healthy, a number of courts have used the Supreme
Court's analysis to conclude that school districts do not share a
state's immunity. In Unified School District No. 480 v. Epper-
son,e6 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on two factors in
determining whether the defendant school district was protected
by the Eleventh Amendment: "(1) To what extent does the board,
although carrying out a state mission, function with substantial
autonomy from the state government and, (2) to what extent is the
agency financed independently of the state treasury. '87
Looking to Kansas law, the court noted that school districts
could sue and be sued, execute contracts, hold real and personal
property, exercise the powers of a corporation, prepare their own
budgets, levy and collect taxes to fund their budgets, and be
treated as municipalities for tax purposes. Though the Kansas
Constitution gave the state "general supervision" over school dis-
tricts, such supervision could not be considered "control." More-
over, any judgment awarded the plaintiffs would not come from
state funds, but from monies raised by special levy within the
school district."8
An analysis similar to that used in the school district cases was
set out in Savage v. Pennsylvania,"" in which a former hearing ex-
aminer for the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (LCB) brought
suit against the Board and other state officials in their governmen-
tal capacities. Looking to the Pennsylvania statutes for guidance
the court articulated the following standard: "[W]hether a govern-
ment agency partakes of the state's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity depends upon whether its powers are 'sufficiently distinct and
sylvania are agencies for which Pennsylvania claims sovereign immunity); Korgich v. Re-
gents of New Mexico School of Mines, 582 F.2d 549, 551 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
personal injury suit against the School of Mines was in effect against the state, and there-
fore barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
66. 583 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1978).
67. Id. at 1121-22.
68. Id. at 1122-23. For other cases in which courts have concluded that a school dis-
trict is not entitled to the state's immunity see Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404
(5th Cir. 1980) (Texas school district); Kingsville Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 611
F.2d 1109, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) (Texas school district); Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Bd., 594 F.2d 489, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1979) (Louisiana school board); Cline v. School Dist. No.
32, 476 F. Supp. 868, 870 (D. Neb. 1979) (Nebraska school district); Stoddard v. School Dist.
No. 1, 429 F. Supp. 890, 892-93 (D. Wyo. 1977), affd, 590 F.2d 829, 835 (10th Cir. 1979)
(Wyoming school district).
69. 475 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aflfd, 620 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1980).
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independent from the state as not to be considered a part of the
state.' ',70 Holding that the LCB and its members were entitled to
share the state's immunity, the court noted that the LCB was an
administrative board subject to the State Administrative Code, its
powerswere statutorily defined, the financial affairs of the Board
and the state liquor stores were monitored by the State Depart-
ment of the Auditor General, the Board was funded totally by the
state, and that the state legislature had specifically waived its sov-
ereign immunity with respect to damages caused by the sale of li-
quor at state liquor stores under certain circumstances.
In Holley v. Lavine,7 1 the defendants argued that a county so-
cial service agency was an arm of the state for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment and section 1983 because it was part of, and
was supervised by, the New York State Department of Social Ser-
vices. Citing provisions of the state constitution and statutes, the
defendants further contended that the state legislature, not the lo-
cal county agencies, had the power to control the public welfare
system and to determine the manner and means of providing pub-
lic assistance to the citizens of the state. They argued, in other
words, the state makes the policy, the locals merely administer it.
Though the court found these to be "substantial arguments,"
it nevertheless concluded that state control of county policy was
not decisive on the Eleventh Amendment issue. More persuasive to
the court was the fact that the county, and not the state, had the
primary obligation to make payments to public assistance
recipients.
In an earlier case, Mackey v. Stanton,7 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals applied Mt. Healthy principles to Indiana law
and also concluded that a county welfare department was indepen-
dent of the state and thus not immune from suit.
In all respects that the Supreme Court seemed to consider
significant in Mt. Healthy, the county department here is similiar
to the school board in that case. Although both are subject to
state supervision and depend heavily on state funds, they perform
70. 475 F. Supp. at 530. The same court used a simliar analysis in an earlier case in
which it found the Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole to be an arm of the state.
Abroad v. Burke, 436 F. Supp. 1307, 1310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
71. 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
72. 605 F.2d at 644.
73. 586 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 882 (1979).
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their duties on a local level. More important, both have the power
to raise their own funds by tax levy and by bond issuance. Signifi-
cantly, Ind. Code Ann. § 12-1-11-13 (Burns) is analogous to Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 133.27 (Page), providing a manner for payment
of judgments without resort to the state treasury.74
Similarly, in Morrison v. Jones,7 5 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the argument by a California county department
of social services that it was entitled to absolute immunity from a
suit brought under section 1983 by a mother whose child had been
declared a dependent of the courts pursuant to the California Wel-
fare and Institutions Code.
B. Criteria for Finding Immunity Under the State Ac-
tion Doctrine
Since 1975, the United States Supreme Court has addressed
itself six times to the issue of state action immunity from the fede-
ral antitrust laws.76 Each one of these six decisions was an attempt
by the Court to define more clearly the standard it had set in its
1943 landmark decision in Parker v. Brown.7
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar7 8 the Court invalidated a
74. 586 F.2d at 1131. But see Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 233 (7th Cir. 1978), in
which the same court concluded that an analysis of Illinois law led to the conclusion that
the Cook County Department of Public Aid was entitled to the state's immunity because it
was defined by statute as an instrumentality of the State of Illinois and an agency of the
Illinois Department of Public Aid. Moreover, the County Department's primary source of
revenue was from the state. Id. at 233-34.
75. 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
76. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 733 (1975); Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); City of LaFayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96 (1978); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1975 & Supp. 1980).
77. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Although the Parker case is grounded on statutory interpreta-
tion some commentators have interpreted the case of National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), to imply Tenth Amendment protection from federal interference with
those types of state action now protected under the Parker decision. See Davidson & But-
ters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal Interdiction of
Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. Rav. 575 (1978). The Court has decided all of
the six cases mentioned above on the basis of statutory interpretation and thus has not had
to reach the issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment would require a similar interpreta-
tion. Of course, Congress could avoid the Eleventh Amendment by permitting jurisdiction
over antitrust cases in the state courts, but it has not chosen to do so. See also Baker,
Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 179 (1977).
78. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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minimum-fee schedule published by a county bar association and
enforced by the Virginia State Bar. Finding that the fee schedule
was in effect price fixing, the Court stated that the standard to be
applied was not whether the anticompetitive activity was
prompted by state action, but rather whether "anticompetitive ac-
tivities [were] compelled by direction of the State acting as a sov-
ereign. ' 79 In other words, was the activity mandated by the state?
The Court concluded that it was not.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,8 0 the Court again rejected a
claim of state action immunity. In this instance the Court found a
public utility liable under the antitrust laws for a tariff approved
by the Michigan Public Service Commission which permitted the
company to conduct a lightbulb exchange program for its custom-
ers. The Court reasoned that the private company had exercised
its own discretion in initiating such a program, while the state
agency had only approved the application in a passive role.""
In a 1977 opinion the'Court granted state action immunity to
an Arizona Supreme Court rule prohibiting the advertising of
attorneys' fees on the grounds that the supreme court was "the
ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of
law." The rule, therefore, "reflect[ed] a clear articulation of the
State's policy" and was "subject to pointed re-examination by the
policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in enforcement
proceedings." ' s
The following year in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.,8 4 the Court rejected the argument of the City of Lafay-
ette that its operation of a city-owned utility was automatically ex-
empt from the Sherman Act because the City was "a subdivision of
the state and only exercise[d] power delegated to it by the state."' 5
Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Mr. Justice Brennan con-
cluded that Parker v. Brown had not "held that all governmental
entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a State, are, sir-
79. Id. at 791.
80. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
81. Id. at 594." The lightbulb program was later described by the Court in Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), as a program "instigated by the utility with only the acquies-
cence of the state regulatory commission." Id. at 362.
82. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977).
83. Id. at 362.
84. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
85. Id. at 394.
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ply by reason of their status as such, exempt from the antitrust
laws."8' 6 Mr. Justice Brennan noted, however, that
the fact that municipalities, simply by their status as such, are
not within the Parker doctrine, does not necessarily mean that all
of their anticompetitive activities are subject to antitrust re-
straints. Since "[m]unicipal corporations are instrumentalities of
the State for the convenient administration of government within
their limits," Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans,
109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883), the actions of municipalities may reflect
state policy. We therefore conclude that the Parker doctrine
exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of
government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pur-
suant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or
monopoly public service. 87
Lafayette was soon followed by New Motor Vehicle Board v.
Orrin W. Fox Co.,8a in which the Court upheld a California statute
requiring automobile manufacturers to obtain the Board's approval
before opening a new automobile dealership within the market
area of an existing franchise, if that franchisee objected. The pur-
pose of the statute was'to protect retail car dealers "from per-
ceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers." 89 The
Court found the regulatory plan to be clearly expressed state pol-
icy and "therefore outside the reach of the antitrust laws under the
'state action' exemption."90
Finally, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,91 the Court summarized two standards its
earlier decisions had established for antitrust immunity under
Parker v. Brown: first, the challenged restraint must be one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; second, the
policy must be actively supervised by the state itself.9 2
86. Id. at 408.
87. Id. at 413. Chief Justice Burger concurred, but would have used the governmental/
proprietary distinction as the basis for municipal antitrust liability, i.e., exempting govern-
mental but not proprietary activities. Id. at 418. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
88. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
89. Id. at 101.
90. Id. at 109. Some observers have suggested that the Court's finding of state action
in this case reflected a conclusion that the state's system "probably results in only minor
injury to competitive structure, with little or no impact on consumer welfare." Sullivan &
Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding
Coverage and Retaining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 265, 303 (1979).
91. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
92. Id. at 105.
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In Midcal the challenged statute failed to meet the second
standard because the state simply authorized price-setting and en-
forced the prices established by private parties. The state did not
set the prices, review their reasonableness, regulate the terms of
fair trade contracts, monitor market conditions, or engage in any
re-examination of the program. 3
Since Midcal, one reported case has applied its standards for
finding immunity from antitrust liability. In Community Commu-
nications Co. v. City of Boulder," the defendant City adopted an
ordinance prohibiting the plaintiff (CCC) from expanding its area
of cable television service within the City for ninety days in order
to provide other cable companies an opportunity to enter the Boul-
der market. The purpose of the ordinance was to prevent CCC
from becoming a monopoly.
Overruling the district court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that the standards of Midcal had been met. First, a
state policy of fostering competition for cable television franchises
was affirmatively expressed through the language of the ordinance,
passed pursuant to the City's home rule powers. Second, the policy
was actively supervised and enforced by imposition of the ninety-
day moratorium and by issuance of civil and criminal citations to
cable workers when the moratorium was violated.95
93. Id.
94. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
95. Id. In regard to the first criteria, the court reasoned that because home rule au-
thority in Colorado is derived directly from the state constitution, an ordinance passed pur-
suant to those powers had the force of state policy. A similar conclusion had been reached in
December 1979, by the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in Glenwillow Land-
fill, Inc. v. City of Akron, 485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ohio 1979). In Glenwillow, the court ruled
that actions taken by the City of Akron to eliminate competition for solid waste disposal
services in the city were immune from antitrust liability because they were taken pursuant
to home rule powers granted by the Ohio Constitution.
A contrary result was reached, however, in Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978), in which the court rejected the City of Dallas' argument that
its grant of a monopoly taxicab franchise at the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport was immune by
virtue of its status as a home rule municipality. Id. at 1032.
See also Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, No. 80-A-752 (U.S.D.C. Colo. Oct. 9, 1980), in
which the court concluded at the motion to dismiss stage that the Colorado zoning enabling
statute met the two-pronged Midcal test by simply authorizing municipalities to zone and
providing for the review of zoning decisions by a local board of adjustment and the district
courts of Colorado. The court held, however, that the defendants were not protected by the
state action doctrine because plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants had acted to pro-
mote their personal property interests. Such conduct was viewed as not within the scope of
conduct contemplated by the legislature when granting authority to zone.
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C. Comparison of Factors for Finding Delegation of
State Immunity
The first conclusion which emerges from our discussion of the
section 1983 cases is that the federal courts recognize that the
question of the delegation of state immunity can only be answered
after a review of applicable state statutes and the powers exercised
by the governmental entity in question. Secondly, the courts have
tended to consider a number of factors in reaching their conclu-
sions as to whether or not an entity is indeed functioning as an
arm of the state:
First, does the state formulate policy which the entity in ques-
tion is mandated to follow,9 6 or does the state merely offer
guidance?9 7
Second, does the state retain the power to enforce or adminis-
ter its policies; does the state have a veto power?' 8
Third, would a judgment for the plaintiff be paid from the
state treasury or by the entity in question?9"
Fourth, does the entity receive operating funds from the state
treasury1 00 or does it rely on local funding? 10 '
Fifth, has the state expressed its intent to confer its immunity
on the entity in question'0 2 or has it expressly withdrawn such
96. See Savage v. Pennsylvania, 475 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
97. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Some federal courts have used a somewhat similar rationale in deciding whether or not to
abstain from deciding land use cases. See Note, Land Use Regulation, The Federal Courts,
and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1151 n.96 (1980).
98. Compare Henry v. Texas Tech Univ., 466 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Tex. 1979) with
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Holley
v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980); and Goss v. San
Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 595 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1979).
99. Compare Skehan v. Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979) and Henry v. Texas Tech Univ., 466 F. Supp. 141
(N.D. Tex. 1979) with Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
913 (1980).
100. See Bailey v. Ohio State Univ., 487 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Savage v.
Pennsylvania, 475 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
101. See Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 595 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1979); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin Univ., 486 F. Supp. 663
(E.D. Tex. 1980).
102. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Savage v.
Pennsylvania, 475 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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immunity? 03
In the area of state action- immunity, the standards expressed
in Midcal are controlling: (1) the challenged restraint must be one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; (2)
the policy must be actively supervised by the state itself. The simi-
larities to the section 1983 policies are inescapable. The two state
action standards are very similar to the first two factors used by
the courts for finding a delegation of state immunity, and arguably
are the most persuasive criteria for making such a finding. The
other three policies used in the section 1983 cases might be equally
appropriate in state action cases if an analogous fact situation were
found to exist.
With the foregoing in mind, Section IV of this article will re-
view the land use control statutes of California, Nevada and Ore-
gon placing emphasis on the issues of state policy formation and
state oversight, while also considering the issues of financing and
intent where appropriate.
IV. Extent of Immunity Delegation in Three State
Land Use Control Systems
A. California
In order to acquire a full understanding of California's land
use control system it is necessary to conduct a two-part analysis.
Under the state's Government Code, mandatory planning policies
are established for most local jurisdictions, but enforcement pow-
ers are not actively executed by any state agency.1°4 In the area of
the state's coastal zone, however, California has chosen to give a
state agency an active role in guiding development.'0 5
1. California Planning and Zoning Statutes
California's planning enabling statute seeks to achieve a bal-
ance between the state's preference that most land use control de-
cisions be made at the local level and the state's desire to guide
such decisions through officially approved statewide goals and poli-
103. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979).
104. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65000-65020.10 (West 1966).
105. CAL. Pun. P~s. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977).
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cies.108 All cities and counties within the state are required to
adopt a long-term general plan,'10 7 which must include nine sepa-
rate subplans, or elements, encompassing land use, traffic circula-
tion, housing, conservation and utilization of natural resources,
open space,108 seismic safety, noise control, scenic highway protec-
tion, and safety from fire and geologic hazards. 109 The substantive
nature of the policies contained in these elements is exemplified by
the land use and housing elements:
The general plan shall consist of a statement of development
policies and shall include a diagram or diagrams and text setting
forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals. The
plan shall include the following elements:
(a) A land use element which designates the proposed gen-
eral distribution and general location and extent of the uses of
the land for housing, business, industry, open space, including ag-
riculture, natural resources, recreation, and enjoyment of scenic
beauty, education, public buildings and grounds, solid and liquid
waste disposal facilities, and other categories of public and pri-
vate uses of land. The land use element shall include a statement
of the standards of population density and building intensity rec-
ommended for the various districts and other territory covered by
the plan. The land use element shall also identify areas covered
by the plan which are subject to flooding and shall be reviewed
annually with respect to such areas.
(b) ...
(c) A housing element, to be developed pursuant to regula-
tions established under Section . . . 50459 of the Health and
Safety Code, consisting of standards and plans for the improve-
ment of housing and for provisions of adequate sites for housing.
This element of the plan shall make adequate provisions for the
housing needs of all economic segments of the community. Such
element shall consider all aspects of current housing technology,
to include provisions for not only site-built housing, but also
106. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65030.1 (West Supp. 1980).
107. Id. § 65300. The general plan is to serve "as a pattern and guide for the orderly
physical growth and development and the preservation and conservation of open space land
of the county or city." Id. § 65400. See Selby Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d
110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774,
782, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 (1965) ("the plan is, in short, a constitution for all future devel-
opment within the city").
108. The open space element, or local open space plan, must comply with the detailed
provisions of CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65560-65564 (West Supp. 1980).
109. Id. § 65302.
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manufactured housing, including mobilehomes and modular
homes.110
In addition to the required elements, local governments may
expand the scope of their plans to include elements concerning rec-
reational facilities, comprehensive transportation systems, public
services and facilities, location of public buildings, elimination of
substandard dwellings, redevelopment, community design and his-
toric preservation. 1"
Once a general plan has been adopted, California law man-
dates that all zoning ordinances be consistent with that plan.
1 2
Though this requirement has been in effect since 1971, it still re-
mains unclear just what "consistent" means." 3 California courts
have, however, considered the issue in a number of decisions. In
Sierra Club v. County of Alameda,"4 the court held that it was not
inconsistent with the county's open space plan to permit a devel-
oper to build a 145-acre recreational facility on land designated for
open space so long as the developer's remaining 2,555 acres re-
mained open. The court stated that "consistency" meant that reg-
ulations must be "closely attuned to the stated policy and goals '""
5
of the plan.
In Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors,"6 the California Su-
preme Court ruled that where the County Board of Supervisors
had approved a developer's tentative subdivision map and the de-
110. Id. See also City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 1975); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 24 CaL3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), af'd, 100 S. Ct. 2138
(1980).
111. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65303 (West Supp. 1980).
112. Id. § 65860. Moreover, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65860(c) (West Supp. 1980) requires
that should a zoning ordinance become inconsistent with a general plan due to an amend-
ment to the plan, the ordinance must be amended within a reasonable time. The consistency
requirements of § 65860 do not apply, however, to charter cities with populations of less
than two million people. Charter cities of more than two million must achieve consistency
by July 1, 1982. Id. §§ 65803, 65860(d). See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
146 Cal. Rptr. 103, 111 (1978), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 49 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1981);
Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 108 n.5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520, 524 n.5
(1976); 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 21 (1975).
113. See Hagman & DiMento, The Consistency Requirement in California, 30 LAND
UsE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 6, at 5-8 (1978). For a discussion of the consistency issue in
California and other states see generally DiMENro, THE CONSISTENcY DOCTRn AND TE
LiMrrs OF PLANNING (1980); DiMento, Improving Development Control Planning: The Con-
sistency Doctrine and the Limits of Planning, 5 COLUM. J. ETLr'L L. 1 (1978).
114. 140 Cal. Rptr. 864, vacated, 572 P.2d 755, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1977).
115. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
116. 22 Cal. 3d 644, 556 P.2d 586, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
Spring 1981] LAND USE SYMPOSIUM
476 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
veloper had subsequently complied with the conditions of the ap-
proval, the Board was required to approve the developer's final
map even though the county general plan had been riodified.11"
In addition to requiring that zoning regulations be consistent
with the general plan, subdivision and parcel map approvals in all
jurisdictions must also be consistent.11 8 Similarly, any actions by
cities or counties affecting open space must be consistent with local
open space plans.11 9
Although California has adopted strong mandatory planning
requirements for local governments, little, if any, enforcement
power is given to any state agency. Sections 65035 and 65040 of the
Government Code authorize the Office of Planning and Research 2"
to develop state land use goals and policies, develop guidelines
which will assist local governments in the preparation of the
mandatory elements of their general plans, and to assist local gov-
ernments generally in land use planning. However, the statutes
specifically provide that such planning guidelines may be viewed
only as advisory12 and that it is not the legislature's intent to vest
in the Office "any direct operating or regulatory powers over land
use."
122
This absence of review authority to determine local govern-
ment compliance with state-mandated planning policies has left
enforcement of these requirements to relatively infrequent Attor-
117. Id. at 657, 586 P.2d at 563, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 249. See also Ensign Bickford Realty
Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Mountain Defense
League v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal. App. 3d 723, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1977); Hawkins v.
County of Marin, 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1976).
118. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66473.5, 66474 (West Supp. 1980). In a recent decision the
court of appeal also implied a requirement that public works projects be consistent with the
general plan. Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward, 106 Cal. App. 3d 988, 165 CaL Rptr.
514 (1980). See also Save El Toro Ass'n v. Days, 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282
(1977); Woodland Hills Residents Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 856 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Cal. 3d 72, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503
(1979). Judicial review of the consistency of zoning regulations with the general plan is
available under the mandamus provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5
(West 1980).
119. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65566, 65910 (West Supp. 1980). In Save El Toro Ass'n v.
Days, 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977), the court held that failure to adopt an
open space plan precluded approval of a subdivision map. Id. at 74, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
120. The Office of Planning and Research is part of the Office of the Governor and
replaced the Council on Intergovernmental Relations. The Office serves as the comprehen-
sive state planning agency. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65040 (West Supp. 1980).
121. Id. § 65040.2.
122. Id. § 65035.
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ney General and private citizen suits.123 Although California courts
have increasingly tended to scrutinize the text of the planning stat-
utes to determine whether local governments have complied, it can
still be fairly said of the body of California decisions that "they
represent a deeply ingrained but not wholly uncritical, deference to
municipal autonomy.'' 1 4
2. California Coastal Act of 1976
After unsuccessful attempts in the early 1970's to persuade the
state legislature to approve a California coastal zone protection
program, frustrated environmentalists made a strategic decision in
1972 to bring their proposal to a vote through the state's initiative
process. That decision resulted in voter approval of Proposition 20,
the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972.125
In 1976, the California legislature reaffirmed the state's com-
mitment to protection of its 1,100-mile coastline1 6 through passage
of the Coastal Act of 1976.127 The 1976 Act continues the two ma-
jor tasks of the Coastal Act of 1972-preparation of comprehensive
plans for the state's coastal zone, and regulation of development
within that zone.' However, as a result of changes in the political
climate most authority over plans and permits was returned to lo-
cal governments, 29 while review authority was retained by the
state.
123. DiMento, supra note 113, 5 COLUM. J. ENV'L L. at 16 n.54. The institution of
citizen suits is subject to the requirement that such actions be filed within 90 days of the
enactment of any new zoning ordinance or the amendment of an existing ordinance. CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 65860(b) (West Supp. 1980).
124. N. WIJLAMs, supra note 9, at 116.
125. CAL. Pun. RFs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West Supp. 1975) (repealed 1977), passed
with 55% of the vote. For a discussion of the history of Proposition 20, see-Douglas &
Petrillo, California's Coast: The Struggle Today-A Plan for Tomorrow (I), 4 FLA. ST. U. L.
Ra. 179, 184-91 (1976); Finnel, Coastal Land Management in California, 4 Am. B. FoUNDA-
TION J. 649, 652-54 (1978).
126. The fifteen counties which include California's 1,110 miles of coastline, contained
63% of the state's population in 1975. Eighty-five percent of the state's population is no
more than an hour away from the coast. DeGrove, supra note 10, at 120.
127. See note 105, supra. By its terms, the 1972 Act expired soon after the 1976 legis-
lative session.
128. DeGrove, supra note 10, at 122.
129. Id. at 128-29. "The key to this shift in attitude lay in the fact that many environ-
mentalists had come to view local governments in a different light over the four year period
from 1972 to 1976. Many environmentalists had been elected to local governments in Cali-
fornia; and thus, were more comfortable with a larger role for local governments in 1976
than in 1972." Id. at 129.
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The three-tier system of coastal regulation established under
the 1972 Act remains. First, local governments are required to pre-
pare a local coastal program 30 for that portion of the coastal zone
lying within their jurisdictions.131 Coastal programs are then sub-
mitted to one of six regional coastal commissions for certification5 2
of their conformity with the policies of the Coastal Act.133 Final
certification of the programs"" and approval of local governments'
zoning ordinances, zoning district maps, and other actions taken to
implement the plans 3 5 must be obtained from the state Coastal
Commission.3 6 Similarly, the Commission must certify all amend-
ments to local programs or local governments' implementing
regulations.13 7
All development within the coastal zone is carefully regulated
by a permit system begun under the 1972 Act and modified by the
legislature in 1976. Under the system, the six regional coastal com-
missions retain the authority to issue coastal development permits
until a local coastal program has been certified. 8 Once the local
program is approved, local governments are given jurisdiction over
130. A local coastal program includes a local government's land use plan, zoning ordi-
nances, zoning district maps, and within sensitive coastal resources areas, other implement-
ing actions. CAL. PuB. Rxs. CoDn § 30108.6 (West Supp. 1980).
131. Id. § 30500 (West 1977). A local government may request the state commission to
prepare its program. Id. § 30500(a).
132. Id. §§ 30511, 30512.
133. Id. §§ 30200-30264. The stated policies of the Act are: (1) development must not
interfere with the public's right of access to the sea (§ 30211); (2) coastal areas suited for
water-oriented recreational activities shall be protected for such uses (§ 30220); (3) use of
the marine environment must be carried out in a manner that will sustain the biological
productivity of the coastal waters (§ 30230); (4) land resources, such as environmentally
sensitive habitat areas, prime agricultural land and timberlands must be protected
(§§ 30240, 30241, 30243); (5) new development must be located in close proximity to ex-
isting development (§ 30250); (6) scenic qualities of coastal areas should be protected
(§ 30251); and (7) coastal-dependent industrial facilities, such as tanker facilities, oil and
gas platforms, refineries, petrochemical facilities, and electric generating plants must be en-
couraged to locate or expand within existing sites (§§ 30260-30264). These policies also serve
as the standards by which coastal development permits are to be measured. (§ 30200).
134. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30512 (West 1977).
135. Id. § 30513.
136. The 15 members of the Coastal Commission are: the Secretary of the Resources
Agency, the Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency, the Chairperson of the
State Lands Commission, six representatives of the public appointed by the governor and
legislative leaders, and six representatives from the regional coastal commissions. Id. §
30301.
137. Id. § 30514.
138. Id. §§ 30600(c), 30601.
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the permit program.""s However, certain types of local decisions
approving specific development projects may be appealed to the
Coastal Commission to determine whether the projects are consis-
tent with the state's mandated policies. 4 °
Unlike the operation of California's planning statutes, the
state retains strong and active control over the planning and im-
plementation activities of local governments mandated by the
Coastal Act. The state's supervisory role is demonstrated by the
statutory powers given to the California Coastal Commission. First,
the Commission has the responsibility to determine whether local
governments' coastal programs, zoning ordinances, and other im-
plementing regulations are consistent with the Coastal Resources
Planning and Management Policies established by the Act.141 Sec-
ond, the Commission continues the state's monitoring role through
its power to review and approve amendments to certified coastal
programs, ordinances and regulations. 42 Third, at least once every
five years after certification, the Commission is required to review
every certified coastal program to determine whether each program
is being implemented in conformity with the policies of the Act; 43
and fourth, the Commission serves as the administrative body to
which decisions by local governments and the regional coastal com-
missions can be appealed.'" Judicial review of any Commission or
regional commission decision is available,145 as are actions for de-
claratory and equitable relief to restrain any alleged violation of
the Act." 6
139. Id. §§ 30519, 30600(d). All development for which a permit application is made
must be found by the issuing agency to be in conformity with the certified local coastal
program. Id. 33 30604(a)-30604(b).
140. Id. § 30603. See also Finnell, supra note 125, at 718.
141. See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 137 and accompanying text supra.
143. CAL. Pun. Rs. CODE § 30519.5 (West 1977).
144. See generally id. §§ 30620-30627. See also id. § 30512(b) (local government ap-
peal of regional commission disapproval of local land use plan); id. § 30513(b) (local govern-
ment appeal of regional commission rejection of local zoning ordinances, zoning district
maps or other implementing actions); id. § 30513(c) (appeal by an aggrieved person of re-
gional commission approval or rejection of local zoning ordinances, zoning district maps or
other implementing actions); id. § 30602(b) (appeal by any person, including the applicant,
of any action taken by a regional commission on a coastal development permit application);
id. § 30603(a)-30603(b) (appeal of a local government action on a coastal permit application
for certain types of developments).
145. Id. § 30801.
146. Id. § 30803.
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Finally, it is significant to note that the Coastal Act provides
financial assistance to local governments to cover the cost of imple-
menting their local coastal programs.'" Moreover, litigation costs
incurred by a local government in a successful defense of its certi-
fied local coastal program may be reimbursed by the state.148 A
recent amendment to the Act authorizes the California Depart-
ment of Justice to provide legal assistance to local governments
upon request so long as the action is not brought by or against the
Coastal Commission. 49
B. Nevada
Nevada has adopted legislation concerning both local zoning
and planning and state land use planning. The zoning statutes
date from 1923. As is common with early enabling legislation, the
statutes permit but do not require the division of a city into dis-
tricts'50 and the regulation of the location, height and use of build-
ings within those districts.' 5' The statutes authorize creation of a
zoning commission, 152 and require that all land use ordinances and
regulations be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan incorpo-
rating at least the mandatory requirements of a master plan."' 53
Since 1941, the Nevada statutes have required the creation of
a planning commission by the governing body of each city and
147. Id. §§ 30350-30355. Such costs include expenditures for establishing a regulatory
program to implement a certified coastal plan (§ 30353(a)), a fixed payment of ten dollars
per permit application (§ 30353(b)), and costs for enforcement of regulatory requirements (§
30353(d)).
148. Id. § 30353(e). Where a local government loses an action brought against its
coastal program because it has failed to properly carry out the program, the statute specifi-
cally prohibits reimbursement of litigation costs. Id.
149. Id. § 30806(B) (effective 1979).
150. NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 268.250, 266.376 (1979). See Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts.,
Inc. v. Hunter Lake Parent Teachers As'n, 443 P.2d 608, 609 (Nev. 1968), rev'd, 451 P.2d
713 (Nev. 1969).
151. NEv. REv. STAT. § 268.240 (1979).
152. Id. §§ 268.280, .290.
153. Id. § 268.260. Section 268.260 also provides some general guidelines for all zoning
regulations. They should be designed to lessen street congestion, secure safety from fire and
other dangers, protect property and promote the health, safety and general welfare, provide
adequate light and air, prevent overcrowding of land and conserve the value of buildings.
In Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc., 516 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Nev. 1974), the
Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed a trial court's conclusion that the rezoning of the re-
spondent's three and one-half acre parcel from residential to neighborhood commercial was
not inconsistent with the City of Reno's comprehensive plan because such change would not
materially affect the residential character of the surrounding property.
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county having a population greater than 15,000 people.1" The
commission is required to prepare and adopt a comprehensive,
long-term master plan for the physical development of the city,
county or region. 155 The master plan, in turn, must include those
elements or sub-plans which are considered relevant (presumably
in the opinion of the commission) to a particular city, county or
region.1 56 The master plan is intended to be a "pattern and guide"
for the orderly physical growth and development of the city or
county,1 57 and all zoning regulations must be adopted. in accor-
dance with the master plan's land use element. 158 Furthermore, the
planning commission is given the responsibility to advise the gov-
erning body on various matters, including the establishment of
zoning districts. 9
In addition to the general zoning and planning enabling provi-
sions of chapters 268 and 278, Nevada has entered, in a limited
way, the area of state land .use planning.160 Although the "State
Land Use Planning" statute emphasizes a philosophy that the pri-
mary responsibility for the land planning process in Nevada should
remain with local governments, 161 the state is given a significant
154. NEv. Rav. STAT. § 278.030 (1979). The governing bodies of cities and counties of
less than 15,000 population are authorized, but not required, to create a planning commis-
sion, or may themselves act as the planning commission. See also Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 20
(1971).
155. N~v. Rav. STAT. § 278.150 (1979). See Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts.,
Inc., 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. 1974). Sections 278.640-.675 authorize the governor of Nevada to
prescribe and administer comprehensive land use plans and zoning regulations for any land
lying within any county exceeding 15,000 in population which is not subject to a comprehen-
sive land use plan adopted pursuant to § 278.150. Such power, however, has not been
exercised.
156: NEv. Rav. STAT. § 278.160 (1979). The plan elements include, but are not limited
to community design, a conservation plan, economic plan, land use plan (described as "an
inventory and classification of natural land types and of existing land cover and uses, and
comprehensive plans for the most desirable utilization of land"), a population plan, public
buildings plan, recreation plan, seismic safety plan, solid waste disposal plan, streets and
highways plan, transit plan, transportation plan, and consideration of public services and
facilities.
157. Id. § 278.230. See Williams v. Griffin, 542 P.2d 732, 733 (Nev. 1975).
158. Nav. REv. STAT. § 278.250 (1979). Section 278.250 also provides some additional
guidelines for all zoning regulations. They should be designed to preserve air and water
quality, promote conservation of open space, provide for recreational needs, protect life and
property in flood-prone areas, and develop a timely arrangement of public services.
159. Id. § 268.240.
160. See generally id. §§ 321.604-.770 (1979) (adopted 1973, amended 1977).
161. Id. § 321.640. Similarly, § 321.710 provides that the "priority activities" of the
state land use planning agency are the provision of technical assistance where such assis-
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role in two specific areas: planning for areas of critical environmen-
tal concern and the resolution of inconsistencies between local land
use plans.
In regard to "areas of critical environmental concern,"1162 the
state land use planning agency is required to provide land use
planning assistance when either the governor directs the agency to
provide such services, or when one or more local governments re-
quest assistance.16 s No mechanism exists by which the state agency
can initiate such a review.
Once an area has been designated for state assistance, the ex-
ecutive council of the state land use planning advisory council'
has the authority to review the matter and make recommendations
for land use planning policies regarding matters of critical environ-
mental concern, and also has authority to formulate land use regu-
lations to carry out such policies. However, no land use regulation
adopted by the executive council may become effective without the
approval of the governor.165
In 1977, the executive council was given strong authority to
resolve inconsistencies between local land use plans when those in-
consistencies could not be resolved through negotiations between
the affected local governments and the administrator of the state
land use planning agency.1 66 After study and hearings, the council
is empowered to adopt land use plans and regulations to imple-
ment its decision. Such plans and regulations supersede inconsis-
tance is requested, activities relating to federal lands in the state, and the review of propos-
als for designations of areas of critical environmental concern. Section 321.720, agency "du-
ties respecting local governments," also reflects a policy to provide informational assistance,
rather than intervening in local land use decisions.
162. Defined in NEv. REv. STAT. § 321.655 (1979) as "any area in this state where there
is or could develop irreversible degradation of more than local significance but does not
include an area of depleting water supply which is caused by the beneficial use or storage of
water in other areas pursuant to legally owned and fully appropriated water rights."
163. Id. § 321.770(1).
164. NEv. REv. STAT. § 321.740 (1979) creates a 17-member state Land Use Planning
Advisory Council appointed by the governor. The members must be elected officials or rep-
resentatives of local political subdivisions, one member from each county. NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 321.755 (1979) creates the executive council of the Land Use Planning Advisory Council,
consisting of four members of the Advisory Council and the administrator of the state land
use planning agency.
165. Id. § 321.770(5). To date, this section has been used in a limited manner in only
one instance.
166. Id. § 321.761.
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tent plans and regulations of the affected local governments. 1 7
However, it is the local governments which are responsible for en-
forcing the executive council's plans and regulations.68
C. Oregon
In 1973, the State of Oregon, long considered an innovator in
regard to protection of its environment, adopted one of the most
comprehensive land use control statutes in the United States. The
impetus for this legislation was concern among Oregonians that the
pressures of urban sprawl would be too great for local governments
to resist absent a forcefully articulated state land use policy.169 The
result was the passage of the Land Conservation and Development
Act.J °0
The provisions of the legislation clearly reflect the view of the
legislature that the state could achieve coordinated and orderly de-
velopment of its lands only if all cities, counties and special dis-
tricts adopted comprehensive plans that implemented mandatory
statewide planning goals and were subject to state review.
To accomplish these ambitious objectives, the Act authorized
the establishment of a Department of Land Conservation and De-
velopment,17 1 and a seven-member Land Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission (LCDC). 72 The LCDC was given broad au-
thority and responsibility to develop statewide planning goals and
guidelines, 78 review city and county comprehensive plans for con-
167. Id. § 321.763(4).
168. Id. §§ 321.736(4)-736(5).
169. Of particular concern was the development pressure on the two million acres of
prime agricultural lands located in the state's Willamette Valley. The Valley's 1970 popula-
tion of 1.5 million people is expected to reach 2.5 million by the year 2000. DeGrove, supra
note 10, at 123.
170. OR. Rav. STAT. § 197.005 (1979). An effort to repeal the Act in 1976 was rejected
by Oregon voters. Huffman & Plantico, Toward a Theory of Land Use Planning: Lessons
from Oregon, 14 LAND AND WATER L. RaV. 1 (1979). See also Morgan & Shonkwiler, State-
wide Land Use Planning in Oregon with Special Emphasis on Housing Issues, 11 URB.
LAw. 1 (1979).
171. OR. Rav. STAT. § 197.075 (1979).
172. Id. § 197.030. The members of the commission are appointed by the governor,
subject to confirmation by the Senate.
173. Id. §§ 197.040(2)(a); -.225, -.230. Between December 1974 and December 1976,
the LCDC adopted 19 goals and guidelines. They are: (1) development of a citizen involve-
ment program to ensure public participation in all phases of the planning process; (2) estab-
lishment of a land use planning process and policy framework to be used as a basis for all
decisions; (3) preservation of agricultural lands; (4) conservation of forest lands for forest
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formity with the statewide planning goals,17 4 and serve as an ap-
peals board to review alleged violations of the Act's policies.175
Under the statute, cities and counties must prepare and adopt
comprehensive plans consistent with the statewide planning goals
approved by the Commission,"'7 and enact zoning, subdivision and
other ordinances or regulations to implement their plans.17 At the
uses; (5) conservation of open space and preservation of scenic resources; (6) maintenance of
the quality of air, water and land resources; (7) protection of life and resources from natural
disasters; (8) satisfaction of recreational needs; (9) improvement of the economy of the
state; (10) provision for the housing needs of the state's citizens; (11) planning for the or-
derly development of public facilities; (12) provision of a comprehensive transportation sys-
tem; (13) conservation of energy; (14) provision for the orderly transition from rural to ur-
ban land use; (15) protection of the lands along the Willamette River; (16) recognition of the
values of estuaries and wetlands and the preservation of such areas; (17) protection of
coastal shorelands; (18) protection of coastal beach and dune areas; and (19) proper manage-
ment and protection of renewable resources of the continental shelf. OREGON LAND CONSER-
VATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS AND GumENES (1976).
174. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.040(2)(e) (1979). The review process is known as "acknowl-
edgement review." As of December 5, 1980, only 88 of 241 cities and 5 of 36 counties had
received approval of their plans and ordinances by the LCDC. Fifty-one local governments
had not as yet even submitted their plans. Telephone conference with LCDC staff (Dec. 29,
1980).
175. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.300-.315 (repealed 1979). The LCDC was also authorized to
review and recommend to the legislature the designation of areas of critical state concern
(§ 197.040(2)(h); prepare land use inventories (§ 197.040(2)(c)); prepare model zoning, sub-
division and other ordinances (§ 197.045(5)); and designate, and issue permits for, activities
of statewide significance (§§ 197.400, -.045, -.040(2)(b), -.410, -.415). The planning and siting
of public transportation facilities, public sewerage systems, water supply systems, solid
waste disposal facilities and public schools may be designated by the LCDC as activities of
statewide significance. Other activities may be recommended by the Commission to the
Joint Legislative Committee on Land Use.
176. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.175(2)(a) (1979). See Alexanderson v. Board of Comm'rs, -
Or. -, 616 P.2d 459 (1980); 1000 Friends of Or. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 32 Or. App.
413, 422, 575 P.2d 651, 656-57 (1978), appeal denied, 284 Or. 41, 584 P.2d 1371 (1978)
(holding that "[c]omprehensive plan amendments ... need not serve the ends of each and
every applicable planning goal .... Compliance is achieved if local governments can ade-
quately demonstrate that an amendment results in a plan which considers and accommo-
dates as much as possible all applicable planning goals"); Petersen v. Klamath Falls, 279 Or.
249, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977); South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs,
27 Or. App. 647, 649, 569 P.2d 1063 (1977), appeal granted, 278 Or. 393 (1977). See also
Commentary, Comprehensive Plans and the Law: The Oregon Experience, 32 LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG. No. 9, at 6 (1980).
177. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.175(2)(b) (1979). The Oregon courts have issued a number
of opinions interpreting the statutory requirement that zoning be consistent with the local
plan. In Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 584, 507 P.2d 23, 28 (1973), the
Supreme Court of Oregon established two standards for proving conformity with the com-
prehensive plan: "(1) there [must be] a public need for a change of the kind in question, and
(2) that need will be best served by changing the classification of the particular piece of
property in question as compared with other available property." In Baker v. City of Mil-
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request of any city or county, the LCDC may review a local com-
prehensive plan and any implementing ordinances to determine
whether the plan or ordinances are in compliance with the state-
wide planning goals." 8
To ensure that all local comprehensive plans are in compliance
with the statewide goals,179 each county is required to review all
local plans within its jurisdiction and advise the relevant governing
body whether or not the plan is in conformity with the statewide
planning goals.18 0 Should the LCDC determine that a plan is not in
conformity with state goals, the Commission has the authority to
issue an order requiring a city, county, state agency or special dis-
trict to take any action necessary to bring its comprehensive plan
or related ordinance into conformity. 81
Legislation passed in 1979182 shifted a significant amount of
the Commission's appellate responsibility to a newly-created Land
Use Board of Appeals, whose members are appointed by the gover-
nor with the consent of the Senate.8 s The Board now has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals filed by any person'8 for administrative
review of land use decisions by cities, counties or special dis-
tricts. 8  Petitions alleging inconsistency of land use decisions with
waukie, 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975), the court held that a comprehensive plan is the
controlling land use planning instrument of a city and that a zoning ordinance which per-
mitted a more intensive use than that permitted by the plan was not in conformity with the
plan. See also Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 552 P.2d 815 (1976); Greb v. Board of
Comm'rs, 32 Or. App. 39, 573 P.2d 733 (1978); Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 26 Or. App.
131, 552 P.2d 552 (1976); Pohrman v. Klamath County Comm'rs, 25 Or. App. 613, 550 P.2d
1236 (1976); Kristensen v. Eugene Planning Comm'n, 24 Or. App. 131, 544 P.2d 591 (1976).
In addition, state agencies must carry out their programs which affect land use in a manner
consistent with the statewide planning goals. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.180 (1979).
178. Id. § 197.251(1).
179. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.250 (1979) requires that all comprehensive plans and any
zoning, subdivision and other ordinances and regulations adopted by a city or county to
carry out such plans, be in conformity with the statewide planning goals.
180. Id. § 197.255.
181. Id. § 197.320. See Columbia County v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 44 Or.
App. 749, 606 P.2d 1184 (1980), affirming an LCDC enforcement order requiring a county
which had failed to adopt a comprehensive plan to submit an interim procedure by which
the county would protect its agricultural lands. Id. at 750, 606 P.2d at 1185. See generally
T. PELHAM, STATE LAND USE PLANNING AND REGULATION 162-64 (1979).
182. 1979 OR. LAws, ch. 772 (effective November 1, 1979) (repealed §§ 197.300, .305,
.310 & .315).
183. Id. § 2(1). The Board may consist of no more than five members.
184. Defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental
subdivision or agency or public or private organization of any kind." Id. § 3(2).
185. "Land use decision" is defined by section 3 of the 1979 Act to mean:
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statewide planning goals are first considered by the Land Use
Board of Appeals, which submits its recommended final order to
the LCDC for review.186 The Board must adopt the Commission's
determination in its final order. 87 Decisions of the Board concern-
ing matters not related to statewide planning goals are not re-
viewed by the LCDC and are final.188 However, all final orders of
the Board may be appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals."'
The Oregon legislature has given strong support to the Land
Conservation and Development Act since its passage. The Act
establishes a Land Conservation and Development Account in the
state treasury, for which $10 million was appropriated for 1978-
1979. Most of these funds are given to local governments to sup-
port their planning efforts. 90
"(1)...
"(a) A final decision or determination made by a city, county or special dis-
trict governing body that concerns the adoption, amendment, or application of:
"(A) The state-wide planning goals;
"(B) A comprehensive plan provision; or
"(C) A zoning, subdivision or other ordinance that implements a comprehen-
sive plan; or
"(b) A final decision or determination of a state agency other than the Land
Conservation and Development Commission, with respect to which the agency is
required to apply the statewide planning goals."
186. OR. LAWS ch. 772, § 6 (1979) provides detailed procedures for the Commission's
review of the Board's recommendation. Each party to the proceeding is given the opportu-
nity to comment in writing on the Board's recommendation and the Commission may per-
mit oral argument if it wishes.
187. Id. § 5(3).
188. Id.
189. Id. § 5(5) (a similar right to judicial review had been provided in § 197.310(5)). A
court may reverse or remand an order only if it finds the order to be unlawful in substance
or procedure, unconstitutional, or not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.
§ 6a(8). See, e.g., State Housing Council v. City of Lake Oswego, - Or. App. -, 617 P.2d
655 (1980) (appeal of an order by the LCDC upholding a "development charge" ordinance
as consistent with statewide planning goals). Though affirming, the court held that the
LCDC did not have jurisdiction to review the adoption and administration of local taxation
and budget policy that might have an impact on land use. See also Haviland v. Land Con-
servation & Dev. Comm'n, 45 Or. App. 761, 609 P.2d 423 (1980) (appeal of an order of the
LCDC determining that a city and county did not violate statewide planning goals by ex-
cluding the landowner's property from the city's urban growth boundaries); Willamette
Univ. v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 45 Or. App. 355, 608 P.2d 1178 (1980); Fish &
Wildlife Dep't v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 37 Or. App. 607, 588 P.2d 80 (1978),
al'd, 288 Or. 203, 603 P.2d 1371 (1979) (appeal of two orders by the LCDC dismissing the
Department's petition for review of a county commission's approval of six subdivision plats);
Schmidt v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 29 Or. App. 665, 564 P.2d 1090 (1977).
190. DeGrove, supra note 10, at 131.
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Finally, as in California's Coastal Act,1 1 chapter 197 provides
some financial assistance to local governments for litigation costs.
The LCDC will pay the reasonable attorney fees and court costs
incurred by a city or county in its defense against any action chal-
lenging any comprehensive plan, zoning, subdivision or other ordi-
nance which was adopted for the primary purpose of complying
with the LCDC statewide planning goals and which does in fact
comply with such goals. From this language, it appears that in lim-
ited circumstances-when the city or county prevails-the state
will bear the costs. 19 2
V. Conclusion
As discussed in Part III of this article, the courts have focused
on several factors to determine whether a state has delegated its
immunity for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and have de-
veloped criteria to determine whether a governmental activity can
claim state action immunity from the federal antitrust'laws.
In both of these areas, the courts have placed emphasis on two
factors: (1) a clearly articulated state policy, and (2) retention by
the state of the power to administer and enforce that policy. Of
additional, but probably secondary, importance is the question of
whether financial liability is assumed by the state.
The California planning and zoning statutes probably satisfy
the first test insofar as they reflect a clear state policy. However, in
regard to the second test, the state does not retain the requisite
supervisory power. No effective mechanism exists whereby the
state may force municipalities' general plans and zoning regula-
tions to embody state policy.
The California coastal zone program, however, appears to
meet both standards. Because the Coastal Commission exercises x
direct supervision over both the adoption of state policies and their
implementation by local governments, 193 the actions of local gov-
ernments pursuant to the Coastal Act would seem entitled to claim
a share of immunity under both antitrust and civil rights laws.1 94
191. See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
192. OR. Rav. STAT. § 197.265 (1979).
193. See notes 133-137, 143-144 and accompanying text supra.
194. To the extent that the appealability of local decisions to the Coastal Commission
provides an administrative remedy, the exhaustion doctrine may provide another defense in
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In contrast, the very general policies established in the Nevada
planning statutes, the optional nature of the elements to be in-
cluded in a city or county master plan,195 and the lack of meaning-
ful state supervision would appear to put the land use decisions of
Nevada local governments beyond the reach of any state immu-
nity. The degree of local government independence is generally far
too great, except perhaps in those instances in which the governor
exercises his authority to prescribe and administer comprehensive
land use plans and zoning regulations for land lying within a
county or city which has failed to adopt a comprehensive plan as
required by law.' 96 In these instances, a local government could
well argue that the degree of state involvement should entitle it to
share in the state's immunity.
Additionally, the state may assume an influential role in the
planning of Nevada's areas of critical environmental concern and
in the resolution of inconsistencies between local land use plans. In
areas of critical environmental concern, the executive council of
the state land use planning advisory council (a body appointed by
the governor) has the authority to make recommendations and
adopt land use planning policies and regulations subject to the ap-
proval of the governor. Similarly, the executive council is empow-
ered to adopt and implement land use plans and regulations which
supersede inconsistent local plans. However, it is the local govern-
ments which enforce the regulations. Should these two statutory
provisions be found to satisfy the test for immunity, they may also
provide a local government with the means to avoid liability for
the administration of state-imposed land use policies and
regulations.19 7
The Oregon program of land use control seems to satisfy all
criteria articulated by the courts as prerequisite to finding delega-
tion of state immunity. The state-adopted planning goals and poli-
regard to those decisions subject to appeal, but the applicability of the exhaustion defense
to § 1983 actions is not clearly established. See Oakes, note 25 supra, at 943 n.207.
195. See notes 155-159 and accompanying text supra.
196. See note 155 supra.
197. Although to date neither § 321.761 nor § 321.770 have been used in response to a
local government request, these provisions could provide a local government faced with a
difficult political issue the opportunity to ask the state land use planning agency to resolve
the matter by imposing land use policies and regulations. The local government might thus
be able to claim the state's immunity, even if administration of the regulations was left to
local government.
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cies are meaningful, supported by detailed regulations,198 and must
be complied with by all local governments. The LCDC provides
state supervision so strict that it has been the source of persistent
criticism by local officials.1 99 In addition, the state bears a substan-
tial percentage of the costs incurred by local governments in imple-
menting the program200 and at least part of the cost in defending
it.20
Though all the implications of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Monell v. Department of Social Services and City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. have yet to be explored, and
though the issues discussed in this article are far from resolution,
anyone designing a land use control program or making decisions
under such a program should be aware of the potential for local
government immunity in structuring their decisionmaking process.
The rewards of such foresight may be significant in the years to
come.
198. See notes 171-175 and accompanying text supra.
199. See Commentary, note 176 supra, at 8-9. One planner was quoted as having
chosen to leave the state because "planning wasn't fun anymore." Id.
200. See note 190 and accompanying text supra.
201. See note 192 and accompanying text supra.
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